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Abstract
This study develops an R&D-based growth model with vertical and horizontal innovation
to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sties
innovation. We analyze the e¤ects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents.
We show that patent protection changes the direction of innovation by having asymmetric
e¤ects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e.,
variety expansion). Calibrating the model and simulating the transition dynamics, we nd
that strengthening the e¤ect of blocking patents sties vertical innovation and decreases
economic growth but increases social welfare due to an increase in horizontal innovation.
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In light of this nding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare
implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional e¤ects
on vertical and horizontal innovation.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the patent system in the US has undergone substantial changes.1 As
a result of this patent reform, the strength of patent protection in the US has increased.
For example, Park (2008) provides an index of patent rights on a scale of 0 to 5 (a larger
number implies stronger protection) and shows that the strength of patent rights in the
US increases from 3.8 in 1975 to 4.9 in 2005.2 In other words, patentholders can now
better protect their inventions against imitation as well as subsequent innovation. When
a patent protects an invention against subsequent innovation, a blocking patent arises. A
classic example of blocking patents is James Watts patent on his steam engine. Boldrin
et al. (2008) argue that "[b]y patenting the separate condenser Boulton and Watt, from
1769 to 1800, had almost absolute control on the development of the steam engine. They
were able to use the power of their patent and the legal system to frustrate the e¤orts of
engineers such as Jonathan Hornblower to further improve the fuel e¢ ciency of the steam
engine." As for the current patent system, economists have become even more concerned
about the innovation-stiing e¤ect of blocking patents. For example, Shapiro (2001) argues
that "[w]ith cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can
have the perverse e¤ect of stiing, not encouraging, innovation." In this study, we provide a
growth-theoretic analysis on the e¤ects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents.
In an environment with cumulative or sequential innovation, blocking patents give rise
to overlapping patent rights across sequential innovators and lead to contrasting e¤ects on
R&D. On the one hand, the traditional view suggests that stronger patent rights improve the
protection for existing inventions and increase their value to the patentholders. On the other
hand, the recent argument against patent protection suggests that stronger patent rights stie
1See Gallini (2002), Ja¤e (2000) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) for a detailed discussion on these changes
in patent policy.
2The index in Park (2008) is an updated version of the index in Ginarte and Park (1997), who examine
ve categories of patent rights and assign a score from zero to one to each category. These ve categories
are patent duration, coverage, enforcement mechanisms, restrictions on patent scope, and membership in
international treaties.
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innovation by giving too much power to existing patentholders, who use this power to extract
surplus from subsequent innovators rather than providing more innovation.3 In this study, we
develop a simple growth model to shed some light on this current debate on whether patents
stimulate or stie innovation. We argue that the two seemingly contradictory views of patents
are in fact two sides of the same coin. In other words, strengthening existing patentholders
protection against future innovations inevitably decreases subsequent innovatorsincentives
for R&D and leads to contrasting e¤ects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement
within an industry) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion that gives rise to new
industries). In light of this nding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and
welfare implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional
e¤ects on vertical and horizontal innovation.
To analyze the asymmetric e¤ects of patent protection on vertical and horizontal innova-
tion, this study develops an R&D-based growth model that features both quality improve-
ment and variety expansion. Within this framework, we derive the growth and welfare e¤ects
of patent protection in the form of blocking patents. A strengthening of blocking patents
refers to the case in which a new innovator (e.g., Jonathan Hornblower) has to transfer a
larger share of his prot to the previous innovator (e.g., James Watt). We nd that there is
a tension between maximizing the incentives for vertical innovation and that of horizontal
innovation. On the one hand, maximizing the incentives for vertical innovation requires a
prot-division rule that allows the new innovator to keep all the prot. On the other hand,
maximizing the incentives for horizontal innovation requires a prot-division rule that assigns
as much prot to the previous innovator as possible. As a result of these asymmetric e¤ects
on vertical and horizontal innovation, strengthening the e¤ect of blocking patents stimulates
variety expansion but sties quality improvement a¤ecting the direction of innovation. This
theoretical result is consistent with the empirical nding in Moser (2005), who provides an
empirical analysis on how patent protection a¤ects the direction of innovation and nds that
3See, for example, Bessen and Meurer (2008), Bodrin and Levine (2008) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004).
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the presence of patent laws in a country causes the inventions to be more diversied and
directed to a broader set of industries than inventions in countries without patent laws.
Furthermore, strengthening the e¤ect of blocking patents has an additional e¤ect through
horizontal innovation on social welfare by increasing the number of varieties, so that there also
exists a welfare-maximizing prot-division rule that is generally di¤erent from the growth-
maximizing rule. Calibrating the model and simulating the transition dynamics, we nd that
an increase in the e¤ect of blocking patents sties vertical innovation and decreases the overall
growth rate despite the increase in horizontal innovation. This nding is consistent with the
recent concerns on the innovation-stiing e¤ects of stronger patent rights. However, we also
nd that social welfare increases despite the lower growth rate suggesting that a proper
welfare analysis should investigate beyond the e¤ects of patent protection on innovation and
economic growth.
Nordhaus (1969) is the seminal study on the optimal design of patent protection, and he
shows that the optimal patent length should balance between the social benet of innovation
and the social cost of monopolistic distortion. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive
review on the subsequent development in this patent-design literature that is mostly based
on partial-equilibrium models. In this literature, an interesting and important policy lever is
forward patent protection (i.e., leading patent breadth) that gives rise to the division of prot
between sequential innovators.4 A recent study by Segal and Whinston (2007) analyzes a
general antitrust policy lever that has a similar e¤ect as the division of prot between entrants
and incumbents. They show that in an innite-horizon model with leapfrogging, protecting
an entrant at the expense of an incumbent has a frontloading e¤ect that potentially increases
innovation. However, they also note that their result does not apply to the rst rm of a
quality ladder because it does not have to share its prot with any incumbent but has
the rights to share the next entrants prot. In the present study, we formalize Segal and
Whinstons interesting insight in a dynamic general-equilibrium model and match the model
4See, for example, Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) for a discussion on the
importance of this policy lever.
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to the US data in order to provide a quantitative analysis on the division of prot between
sequential innovators.
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) merge the patent-design literature and the R&D-
based growth literature by incorporating leading breadth into a quality-ladder growth model
with overlapping patent rights across sequential innovators. In their model, for a given rate
of innovation, strengthening the e¤ect of blocking patents by reducing the share of prot
assigned to the current innovator (i.e., the entrant of a quality ladder) while holding leading
breadth constant would decrease the incentives for innovation. Intuitively, along the quality
ladder, every innovator is rstly an entrant and then becomes an incumbent whose patent
is infringed upon. Therefore, setting aside the issues of prot growth and discounting, every
innovator receives the same amount of prot over the lifetime of an invention. Given that
the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate in their model, delaying the receipt of
prots reduces the present value of the income stream. As a result, the complete frontloading
prot-division rule (i.e., allowing the entrant to keep all the prot) tends to maximize the
market value of an invention and the incentives for R&D.5 However, in the present study
with both vertical and horizontal innovation, this result no longer holds. In this case, the
inventor of a new variety is the rst innovator on a quality ladder; therefore, assigning a
larger share of prot to the incumbent increases horizontal innovation. Given that qual-
ity improvement and variety expansion are both important channels for economic growth,
the growth-maximizing prot-division rule should balance between the asymmetric e¤ects of
prot division on vertical and horizontal innovation. Furthermore, given that growth max-
imization does not necessarily give rise to welfare maximization, we characterize both the
growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing prot-division rules.
This study also relates to other growth-theoretic studies on patent policy. Judd (1985)
provides the seminal dynamic general-equilibrium analysis on patent length, and he nds that
an innite patent length maximizes innovation and welfare. Subsequent studies nd that
5See also Chu (2009) for a quantitative analysis of the prot-division rule in the ODonoghue-Zweimuller
model.
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strengthening patent protection in various forms does not necessarily increase innovation and
may even stie it. Examples include Horowitz and Lai (1996) on patent length, ODonoghue
and Zweimuller (2004) on leading breadth and patentability requirement, Koleda (2004) on
patentability requirement, and Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on patent
protection against imitation. The present study di¤ers from these studies by (a) analyzing
a di¤erent patent-policy lever (i.e., the prot-division rule between sequential innovators)
and (b) emphasizing the asymmetric e¤ects of patent protection on vertical and horizontal
innovation.6 In other words, rather than analyzing the e¤ects of patent policy on the level
of innovation as is common in the literature, we consider a much less explored question that
is the e¤ects of patent policy on the composition or direction of innovation.
Cozzi (2001) analyzes patent protection in the form of intellectual appropriability (i.e.,
the ability of an innovator to patent her invention in the presence of spying activities) in
a quality-ladder model. Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) extend this analysis into a model with
both vertical and horizontal innovation. In their model, spying activities are targeted only
at quality improvement. Therefore, strengthening intellectual appropriability stimulates
vertical innovation (at the expense of horizontal innovation) and increases long-run growth
because horizontal innovation only has a level e¤ect in their model for removing scale e¤ects.
In contrast, long-run growth depends on both vertical and horizontal innovation in the
present study,7 and hence, the asymmetric e¤ects of prot division on vertical and horizontal
innovation give rise to a growth-maximizing prot-division rule.
Acs and Sanders (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009) also analyze the division of prot
between innovators. Acs and Sanders (2009) analyze the separation between invention and
commercialization in a variety-expanding model while Cozzi and Galli (2009) consider basic
research and applied research in a quality-ladder model. In these studies, each invention (i.e.,
6ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) also consider a model with both vertical and horizontal innovation in
their appendix. However, their focus is on the e¤ects of patentability requirement and leading breadth, and
they did not analyze the e¤ects of alternative prot-division rules in the presence of vertical and horizontal
innovation.
7See footnotes (8) and (26) for a discussion on the issue of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
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a new variety or a quality improvement) is created in a two-step innovation process; therefore,
there exists a growth-maximizing division of prot that balances between the incentives of
the rst and second innovators of each invention. The present study di¤ers from these studies
by analyzing the division of prot between sequential innovators within the same industry
(in which every innovator is rstly an entrant and then becomes an incumbent). Also,
we consider a model that features both vertical and horizontal innovation. We nd that
frontloading (backloading) the income stream along the quality ladder stimulates vertical
(horizontal) innovation, and it is the interaction of these two types of innovation that gives
rise to a growth-maximizing prot-division rule in this study.
This study also relates to Acemoglu (2009), who shows that under the current patent
system, the equilibrium diversity of innovation is insu¢ cient. In other words, innovators have
too much incentive to invest in R&D on improving existing products but too little incentive to
invest in R&D on developing new products that may become useful in the future. Acemoglu
suggests that increasing the diversity of researchers could be a partial remedy against this
problem of insu¢ cient diversity. The present study suggests another possible solution that
is to increase the share of prot assigned to the pioneering inventor of a product. In this
case, there will be a reallocation of research inputs from vertical innovation (i.e., R&D on
existing products) to horizontal innovation (i.e., R&D on new products).
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
denes the equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium allocation. Section 4 considers the
growth and welfare e¤ects of patent protection. Section 5 calibrates the model and simulates
the transition dynamics to provide a quantitative analysis. The nal section concludes.
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2 The model
To consider both vertical and horizontal innovation in an R&D-based growth model,8 we
modify the Grossman-Helpman (1991) quality-ladder model9 by endogenizing the number of
varieties in the economy. Furthermore, to consider the division of prot between sequential
innovators along the quality ladder, we assume that each entrant (i.e., the most recent
innovator) infringes the patent of the incumbent (i.e., the previous innovator). As a result
of this patent infringement, the entrant has to transfer a share s 2 [0; 1] of her prot to the
incumbent. However, with vertical innovation, every innovators patent would eventually
be infringed by the next innovation, and she can then extract a share s of prot from the
next entrant. This formulation of prot division between sequential innovators originates
from ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004). As for horizontal innovation, the invention of a
new variety does not infringe any patent,10 so that a variety inventor does not have to share
her prot but maintains the rights to extract prot from the next entrant. Given that the
Grossman-Helpman model is well-studied, we will describe the familiar features briey to
conserve space and discuss new features (i.e., variety expansion and prot division) in details.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Their lifetime utility is given by
U =
1Z
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
8See, also, Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999a, 1999b), Howitt (1999), Jones (1999), Li (2000), Peretto
(1998, 1999), Peretto and Smulders (2002), Segerstrom (2000) and Young (1998). The focus of these studies
is on the removal of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models. Given that scale e¤ect is not the focus of
this study, we normalize the supply of skilled labor to unity to set aside this issue.
9See also Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other pioneering studies on the
quality-ladder growth model.
10In the main text, we also discuss the alternative case in which a newly invented variety infringes the
patents of other existing varieties.
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where  > 0 is discount rate, and ct is the consumption index at time t. The consumption
index is dened as11
ct  exp
0@ ntZ
0
ln yt(i)di
1A . (2)
(2) shows that the households derive utility by consuming a continuum of products yt(i). In
Grossman and Helpman (1991), there is a unit continuum of these products. In the present
study, we endogenize the number of varieties by allowing for horizontal innovation. nt is the
number of active varieties that are consumed by households at time t, and its law of motion
is given by
:
n

t =
:
nt   nt . (3)
nt is the total number of varieties that have been invented in the past, and
:
nt is the number
of newly invented varieties at time t. We follow Grossman and Lai (2004) to allow for the
possibility that an invented variety becomes obsolete at some point. For tractability, we
assume that each active variety i 2 [0; nt ] at time t faces the same probability  > 0 to
become permanently obsolete.12
Households maximize (1) subject to
:
at = rtat + wh;t + wl;tL 
ntZ
0
pt(i)yt(i)di. (4)
at is the value of assets owned by households, and rt is the rate of return. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that households supply one unit of high-skill labor for R&D and L > 1
units of low-skill labor for production.13 The wage rates for high-skill and low-skill labors
11In their appendix, ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) also consider this Cobb-Douglas specication,
which is similar to the CES form in Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom (2000) except for the di¤erent elasticity
of substitution across varieties. In this study, we focus on the Cobb-Douglas aggregator which enables us to
compute the consumption indexs transition path along which the arrival rate of innovation varies.
12Due to the quality distribution across varieties, the model would become considerably more complicated
if we allow the obsolescence rate to depend on the age of a variety.
13In Grossman and Helpman (1991), a homogenous type of labor is allocated between R&D and production.
In reality, R&D engineers and scientists often have a high level of education. Given that this model features
two R&D sectors involving the allocation of high-skill labor, we naturally distinguish between high-skill
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are wh;t and wl;t respectively. pt(i) is the price of product i at time t. If we denote t as the
Hamiltonian co-state variable, then householdsintratemporal optimality condition is
pt(i)yt(i) = 1=t (5)
for i 2 [0; nt ], and the intertemporal optimality condition is
rt =  
:
t=t. (6)
2.2 Production
There is a continuum of active varieties i 2 [0; nt ] that are consumed by households at time
t. The production function for the most recent innovator in industry i is
yt(i) = z
qt(i)lt(i). (7)
The parameter z > 1 is the exogenous step size of each productivity improvement. qt(i)
is the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t.
lt(i) is the number of low-skill production workers employed in industry i. Given zqt(i), the
marginal cost of production for the most recent innovator in industry i is
mct(i) = wl;t=z
qt(i). (8)
Notice that we here adopt a "cost reducing" view of vertical innovation following Peretto
(1998, 1999) and Peretto and Smulders (2002).14 In each industry that has at least two
labor for R&D and low-skill labor for production. However, it is useful to note that our main result (i.e., an
increase in s increases horizontal innovation but decreases vertical innovation) carries over to a setting with
homogenous labor that is allocated across production, vertical R&D and horizontal R&D, but the analysis
becomes more complicated.
14It is useful to note that cost reduction is isomorphic to quality improvement in these studies as well as
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generations of innovation, the most recent innovator infringes the previous innovators patent.
As a result of this patent infringement, the most recent innovator pays a licensing fee by
transferring a share s of her prot to the previous innovator. We follow ODonoghue and
Zweimuller (2004) to consider an exogenous prot-division rule.15 ;16 This prot-division rule
can be interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining game, in which the bargaining power of
each side can be inuenced by patent policy.17 Therefore, it is not an unrealistic assumption
to treat s as a policy parameter.
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) are interested in the e¤ects of leading breadth on
R&D and economic growth through the consolidation of market power that enables the most
recent innovator and the previous innovator to consolidate their market power and charge a
higher markup. We do not adopt this formulation here for three reasons. First, the collusion
between innovators may be prohibited by antitrust laws. Second, the licensing agreement
only allows the most recent innovator to produce, but it may not prevent the previous
innovator from selling her products at a lower price. As a result, the previous innovator may
have the incentives to continue selling her products and undercut the markup. Third, we
want to focus on the prot-division e¤ect (instead of the markup e¤ect) of patent protection
in this study. Given these considerations, we assume that the most recent innovator and the
in the current framework. To see this, the reader could easily reinterpret yt(i) as the consumption of the
latest version, qt(i), of product i, along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (1991), that is by assuming
ln ct 
0B@ n

tZ
0
ln
qt(i)X
j=0
zjyt(i)di
1CA, with consumption good {s production function given by yt(i) = lt(i). Clearly,
the prot function (10) would follow directly from Bertrand competition, instead of the no longer valid (8)
and (9).
15ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the more general case in which the current innovator may
infringe the patents of multiple previous innovators. For the purpose of the present study, it is su¢ cient
to demonstrate the asymmetric e¤ects of the prot-division rule on vertical and horizontal innovation by
considering the simple case of prot division between the entrant and the incumbent.
16Chu and Pan (2010) analyze the e¤ects of blocking patents under the case of an endogenous prot-division
rule and an endogenous step size of innovation in a quality-ladder model with only vertical innovation. As
in the present study, they also nd that blocking patents have a non-monotonic e¤ect on economic growth.
17In reality, a patentholder enforces her patent rights through the Court, which decides her case of patent
infringement against a potential infringer. Therefore, when it becomes more likely for the Court to favor
patentees, the bargaining power of patentholders strengthens relative to potential infringers. Of course, this
will indirectly a¤ect also the outcomes of potential pre-trial settlements.
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previous innovator engage in the usual Bertrand competition as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991). The prot-maximizing price for the most recent innovator is a constant markup
(given by the step size z) over her own marginal cost in (8).18
pt(i) = z(wl;t=z
qt(i)). (9)
Given (7) - (9), the monopolistic prot generated by the most recent innovation is
t(i) = (z   1)wl;tlt(i) =

z   1
z

1
t
, (10)
where the second equality is obtained by using (5), (7) and (9). Due to prot division, the
most recent innovator obtains (1  s)t while the previous innovator obtains st. The above
discussion implicitly assumes that the most recent innovation and the second-most recent
innovation are owned by di¤erent rms (i.e., the Arrow replacement e¤ect). In Lemma 1, we
show that the Arrow replacement e¤ect is indeed present in this quality-ladder model with
prot division.19
Lemma 1 The Arrow replacement e¤ect is present.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Finally, for a newly invented variety, we make the usual simplifying assumption that the
productivity of labor in each new variety20 is randomly drawn from the existing distribution
18Li (2001) considers a CES version of (2) without horizontal innovation. In this case, the monopolistic
markup is determined by either the quality step size or the elasticity of substitution depending on whether
innovation is drastic or non-drastic. Without loss of generality, we focus on non-drastic innovation as in the
original Grossman-Helpman model.
19Cozzi (2007) shows that the Arrow e¤ect is not necessarily inconsistent with the empirical observation
that incumbents often target innovation at their own industries. Under this interpretation, the incumbents
choice of R&D is simply indeterminate, so that the aggregate economy behaves as if innovation is targeted
only by entrants. See also Etro (2004, 2008) for an interesting analysis on innovation by incumbents with a
rst-mover advantage.
20Or the quality of each new variety, in the equivalent quality ladder interpretation explained above.
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of active products i 2 [0; nt ]. We also assume that a variety inventor can only patent
the most advanced technology. Given that the lower-productivity production methods are
unpatented, Bertrand competition drives the markup down to z as well.21 However, because
there is no previous patentholder in the newly created industry, the variety inventor obtains
the entire  until the next productivity improvement occurs, and then she can extract s
from the entrant.
What happens when a variety invention infringes the patents of existing varieties? For
example, Hall et al. (2001) dene an original innovation as "a patent that cites a broad
set of technologies or which has a certain percentage of citations given to di¤erent patent
classes". If we view an original innovation as a horizontal innovation and assume that
the probability of patent infringement is increasing in the number of patent citations, then
horizontal innovation may in fact be more at risk of patent infringements. Here we discuss the
implication of an alternative assumption that a newly invented variety infringes all previous
horizontal patents. In this case, the infringed patentholders should all claim a right to share
among themselves a fraction of the prots. But this means that the share that will go to
each infringed patentholder is zero as a result of the continuum of products (or tending to
zero with countable products). Let us assume that each infringed party has to pay a however
small, but discrete, legal fee " in order to sue the infringer. Then, in equilibrium no previous
horizontal innovator will ever sue the current horizontal innovator.
2.3 Vertical innovation
Denote v2;t(i) as the value of the patent held by the second-most recent innovator in industry
i. Because t(i) = t for i 2 [0; nt ] from (10), v2;t(i) = v2;t in a symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,
an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries).22 In this case, the familiar no-arbitrage
21In the alternative case of drastic innovation, a new variety inventor and the most recent innovator for
an existing variety would also choose the same equilibrium markup that is determined by the elasticity of
substitution.
22We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi
(2005) and Cozzi et al. (2007) for a discussion on the symmetric equilibrium in the quality-ladder model.
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condition for v2;t is
rtv2;t = st +
:
v2;t   ( + t)v2;t. (11)
The left-hand side of (11) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (11) is the sum
of (a) the prot st received by the patentholder, (b) the potential capital gain
:
v2;t, and (c)
the expected capital loss due to obsolescence v2;t and creative destruction tv2;t, where t
is the Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the industry. As for the value of the patent held
by the most recent innovator, the no-arbitrage condition for v1;t is
rtv1;t = (1  s)t + :v1;t   ( + t)v1;t + tv2;t. (12)
The intuition behind (12) is the same as (11) except for the addition of the last term. When
the next quality improvement occurs, the most recent innovator becomes the second-most
recent innovator and hence her net expected capital loss is t(v1;t   v2;t).
There is a unit continuum of vertical-R&D rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1] doing research on
vertical innovation in each industry i. They hire high-skill labor hq;t(j) to create productivity
improvements, and the expected prot of rm j is
q;t(j) = v1;tt(j)  wh;thq;t(j). (13)
The rm-level arrival rate of innovation is
t(j) =
 
'q;thq;t(j), (14)
where
 
'q;t is the productivity of vertical R&D at time t. The zero-expected-prot condition
for vertical R&D is
v1;t
 
'q;t = wh;t. (15)
We follow Jones and Williams (2000) to assume that
 
'q;t = 'q(hq;t)
q 1, where 'q > 0
15
is a productivity parameter for vertical R&D and q 2 (0; 1) captures the usual negative
externality in intratemporal duplication within each industry. In equilibrium, the industry-
level arrival rate of innovation equals the aggregate of rm-level arrival rates. Therefore, at
the aggregate level, the arrival rate of vertical innovation for each variety is t = 'q(hq;t)
q .23
2.4 Horizontal innovation
Denote vn;t as the value of inventing a new variety. The no-arbitrage condition for vn;t is
rtvn;t = t +
:
vn;t   ( + t)vn;t + tv2;t. (16)
The only di¤erence between (12) and (16) is that a variety inventor captures t while a
quality innovator captures (1 s)t. There is also a unit continuum of horizontal-R&D rms
indexed by k 2 [0; 1] doing research on creating new varieties. They hire high-skill labor
hn;t(k) to create inventions, and the prot of rm k is
n;t(k) = vn;t
:
nt(k)  wh;thn;t(k). (17)
The number of inventions created by rm k is24
:
nt(k) =
 
'n;thn;t(k), (18)
where
 
'n;t is the productivity of horizontal R&D at time t. The zero-prot condition for
horizontal R&D is
vn;t
 
'n;t = wh;t. (19)
23Despite decreasing returns to scale at the aggregate level, we assume constant returns to scale at the
rm level in order to be consistent with free entry and zero expected prot in the R&D sector.
24Due to the assumption of a continuum of varieties, there is no strategic interaction across varieties.
Therefore, we do not need to distinguish between single-product and multi-product rms.
16
Again,
 
'n;t = 'n(hn;t)
n 1, where 'n > 0 is a productivity parameter for variety-expanding
R&D and n 2 (0; 1) captures the duplication externality in horizontal innovation. At the
aggregate level, the total number of inventions created at time t is
:
nt = 'n(hn;t)
n. (20)
3 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path fyt(i); lt; hq;t; hn;t; rt; pt(i); wl;t; wh;t; vn;t; v1;t; v2;tg, t  0. Also,
at each instant of time,
 households maximize utility taking frt; pt(i); wl;t; wh;tg as given;
 production rms produce fyt(i)g and choose fpt(i)g to maximize prot taking fwl;tg
as given;
 vertical-innovation rms choose fhq;tg to maximize expected prot taking fwh;t; v1;tg
as given;
 horizontal-innovation rms choose fhn;tg to maximize prot taking fwh;t; vn;tg as given;
 the low-skill labor market clears such that nt lt = L; and
 the high-skill labor market clears such that hn;t + nthq;t = 1.
3.1 Stationary equilibrium
We focus on a stationary equilibrium, in which the number of active varieties is constant.
Substituting (20) into (3) yields
:
n

t = 'n(hn;t)
n   nt . Therefore,
:
n

t = 0 implies that
n =
:
n= = 'n(hn)
n=. (21)
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The number of production workers per variety is
l =
L
n
=
L
'n(hn)
n
. (22)
Let us choose low-skill labor as the numeraire (i.e., wl;t = 1 for all t). Then, combining (5),
(7) and (9) shows that  is constant in the stationary equilibrium implying that r =  from
(6) and
:
t=t = 0 from (10). Applying the stationary equilibrium conditions on (11), (12)
and (16) yields
v1 =
(1  s) + v2
+  + 
=

+  + 

1  s+ s 
+  + 

, (23)
vn =
 + v2
+  + 
=

+  + 

1 + s

+  + 

. (24)
(24) shows that the value of a new variety vn is increasing in s for a given innovation rate 
because a larger s allows the variety inventor to extract more prot from the next innovator.
In contrast, (23) shows that the value of a productivity improvement v1 is decreasing in s for
a given  because of the backloading e¤ect =(+  + ) < 1. In other words, delaying the
income stream reduces its expected present value due to discounting  and the possibility of
obsolescence .
Substituting (23) and (24) into v1
 
'q = vn
 
'n from (15) and (19) yields
(hn)
1 n =
 
'n
'q
+  + (1 + s)'q(hq)
q
(1  s)(+ ) + 'q(hq)q
!
(hq)
1 q . (25)
We will refer to (25) as the arbitrage condition. To close the model, we manipulate hn;t +
nthq;t = 1 to derive
(1  hn)
'n(hn)
n
= hq. (26)
We will refer to (26) as the resource constraint. The equilibrium allocation of high-skill labor
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is implicitly determined by solving (25) and (26). Taking the total di¤erentials of (26) yields
dhn
dhq
=  

1  hn
hn + n(1  hn)

hn
hq
< 0. (27)
In other words, the resource constraint describes a negative relationship between hn and hq.
As for the arbitrage condition in (25), hq has opposing e¤ects on the arbitrage condition.
On the one hand, an increase in hq decreases
 
'q. For a given value of vn=v1, hn must rise
and
 
'n must fall to balance v1
 
'q = vn
 
'n . On the other hand, a larger hq increases  and
decreases vn=v1 when s > 0. If this latter e¤ect is strong enough, it may lead to a decrease
in hn. Taking the total di¤erentials of (25) yields
dhn
dhq
=
1
1  n
 
1  q   q
s2(+ )
+  + (1 + s)'q(hq)
q
'q(hq)
q
(1  s)(+ ) + 'q(hq)q
!
hn
hq
. (28)
(28) shows that dhn=dhq must be positive when hq equals zero or becomes su¢ ciently large.
However, at intermediate values of hq, it is possible for dhn=dhq to be negative. In this
case, there may be multiple equilibria. To rule out multiple equilibrium, which is not the
focus of this study, Lemma 2 derives the parameter condition under which (28) is always
positive, which is su¢ cient to ensure that the stationary equilibrium is unique. Lets dene
a parameter threshold q  [1  0:5s2=(1 +
p
1  s2)] 2 [0:5; 1].
Lemma 2 If q < q, then dhn=dhq > 0 in (28) 8hq > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Figure 1 plots (25) and (26) in the (hq; hn) space. The resource constraint (RC) is
negatively sloped while the arbitrage condition (AC) is positively sloped given the parameter
condition in Lemma 2.
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Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, it must be unique. Also, a larger s increases the
market value of a new variety and decreases that of a quality improvement; consequently,
horizontal R&D hn rises and vertical R&D hq falls. Given this intuitive result (summarized
in Proposition 1), the next section uses the growth-theoretic framework to analyze the e¤ects
of the prot-division rule on economic growth and social welfare.
Proposition 1 Given q <
 
q, there exists a unique equilibrium (hq; hn). The equilibrium
hn(s) is increasing in s whereas hq(s) is decreasing in s.
Proof. At hq = 0, hn = 0 in (25) and hn = 1 in (26). As hq approaches innity, hn in
(26) approaches zero. Therefore, (25) and (26) must cross exactly once given Lemma 2. An
increase in s shifts up (25) in the (hq; hn) space leading to an increase in hn and a decrease
in hq. See Figure 1.
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4 Growth and welfare e¤ects of blocking patents
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of blocking patents on economic growth and social
welfare. We rst derive the growth-maximizing prot-division rule and then the welfare-
maximizing rule. Finally, we compare them and characterize the condition under which one
is above the other.
4.1 The growth-maximizing prot-division rule
To derive the balanced growth rate of the consumption index, we substitute (7) into (2) to
obtain
ln ct =
nZ
0
[qt(i) ln z + ln l(i)]di =
0@n tZ
0
d
1A ln z + n ln l. (29)
The second equality of (29) is obtained by (a) applying symmetry l(i) = l from (10), (b)
normalizing q0(i) = 0 for all i, and (c) using the law of large numbers that implies
nZ
0
qt(i)di =
n
tZ
0
d .25 Di¤erentiating (29) with respect to time yields the balanced growth rate of the
consumption index given by
g 
:
ct
ct
= n ln z, (30)
where the steady-state number of varieties is n = 'n(hn)
n=, and the arrival rate of
productivity improvement in each industry is  = 'q(hq)
q .
Corollary 1 n is increasing in s whereas  is decreasing in s.
Proof. Recall that n = 'n(hn)n= and  = 'q(hq)
q . Then, from Proposition 1, hn is
increasing in s whereas hq is decreasing in s.
25Note that at each instant of time, the average quality of new varieties is the same as the average quality
of obsolete varieties because they are drawn from the same quality distribution. In Appendix B, we derive
an expression for ln ct when nt varies over time.
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To see why the equilibrium growth rate depends on the number of varieties, lets consider
the symmetric case of (2) given by ln ct = n ln yt(i). Di¤erentiating ln ct with respect to
time yields g = n
:
yt(i)=yt(i). In other words, for a given quality growth rate of each variety,
increasing the number of varieties causes the aggregate consumption index to grow at a
higher rate.26 Given that increasing s has a positive e¤ect on n and a negative e¤ect on
, there is generally a growth-maximizing prot-division rule. Di¤erentiating the log of (30)
with respect to s yields
1
g
@g
@s
=
n
hn
@hn
@s
+
q
hq
@hq
@s
, (31)
where @hn=@s > 0 and @hq=@s < 0 from Proposition 1. From (27), we can derive
1
hn
dhn
ds
=   1
hq

1  hn
hn + n(1  hn)

dhq
ds
. (32)
Substituting (32) into (31) yields
1
g
@g
@s
=   1
hq

n(1  hn)
hn + n(1  hn)
  q

dhq
ds
. (33)
Therefore,
@g
@s
> 0, hn(s) <  
n(1  q)
q + n(1  q)
. (34)
To gain a better understanding of (34), we maximize (30) by directly choosing hn and
hq subject to (26). Substituting  = 'q(hq)
q and hq = (1   hn)=n into (30) yields g =
(n)1 q(1   hn)q'q ln z, where n = 'n(hn)n= from (21). It is easy to show that the
growth-maximizing hn is given by , which is increasing in n and decreasing in q. In other
words, as horizontal R&D exhibits a smaller degree of negative duplication externality (i.e.,
a larger n) or as vertical R&D exhibits a larger degree of duplication externality (i.e., a
26It is useful to note that this result of horizontal innovation a¤ecting long-run growth does not rely on
a stationary number of varieties. In the case of a growing number of varieties, horizontal innovation would
still have an e¤ect on long-run growth if the long-run variety growth rate is endogenous. However, it is
common for studies on R&D-based growth models with vertical and horizontal innovation to assume a setup
in which the long-run variety growth rate is equal to the exogenous population growth rate for the purpose
of eliminating scale e¤ects.
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smaller q), the economy should allocate more research labor to horizontal R&D to maximize
economic growth. Therefore, the growth-maximizing prot-division rule sg  argmax g(s)
is characterized by moving the equilibrium hn(sg) to as close to  as possible.
Proposition 2 If an interior growth-maximizing prot-division rule sg exists, it is implicitly
dened by hn(sg) = . If hn(0) > , then sg = 0. If hn(1) < , then sg = 1.
Proof. Note (33) and (34). Also, recall that hn(s) is increasing in s.
4.2 The welfare-maximizing prot-division rule
To derive the steady-state welfare,27 we normalize the time index such that time 0 is the
instant when the economy reaches the stationary equilibrium. In this case, (1) becomes28
U =
1


ln c0 +
g


=
1


n ln l +
n ln z


, (35)
where l = L=n is decreasing in s. In other words, social welfare is determined by the growth
rate g as well as the initial level of consumption ln c0. Because of this additional level e¤ect,
the welfare-maximizing prot-division rule is generally di¤erent from the growth-maximizing
rule. When s increases, it creates a positive e¤ect as well as a negative e¤ect on ln c0 = n ln l.
By increasing hn and n, a larger s increases the number of varieties available for consumption
on the one hand and decreases output per variety on the other. Di¤erentiating ln c0 with
respect to s yields
@ ln c0
@s
= (ln l   1) @n

@s
, (36)
27In this section, we restrict our attention to steady-state welfare. A more complete welfare analysis would
take into account the evolution of householdsutility during the transitional path from the initial state to the
steady state, and we will perform this analysis numerically in the next section. However, such an analysis
is analytically much more complicated. Therefore, we rstly follow the usual treatment in the literature
to derive the optimal patent policy that maximizes steady-state welfare. See, for example, Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2009), Futagami and Iwaisako (2003, 2007) and Grossman and Lai (2004).
28Equation (35) is based on the normalization that q0(i) = 0 for all i. If we modify this normalization to
q0(i) = q > 0 for all i, then there will be an extra term nq ln z inside the bracket in (35). It can be shown
that q > 0 has the same e¤ect as a larger L on steady-state welfare.
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where n = 'n(hn)
n= so that @n=@s > 0. Therefore,
@ ln c0
@s
> 0, hn(s) <  

L
'ne
1=n
, (37)
where e = exp(1). In other words, the level of hn that maximizes initial consumption is
given by : Equation (22) shows that for a given (hn)n, a larger L='n increases l, so that
hn can be larger while initial consumption still rises.
Di¤erentiating (35) with respect to s yields
@U
@s
=
1


@ ln c0
@s
+
1

@g
@s

. (38)
Denote the welfare-maximizing prot-division rule by su  argmaxU(s).29 In Proposition
3, we show that
su  sg ,   . (39)
Intuitively, the welfare-maximizing hn balances between the growth e¤ect and the initial-
level e¤ect on welfare. Therefore, it is a weighted average of  and . If   , then the
welfare-maximizing hn is above the growth-maximizing hn, and vice versa. Given that hn(s)
is increasing in s,    would also imply su  sg.
Proposition 3 The welfare-maximizing prot-division rule su is below (above) the growth-
maximizing prot-division rule sg if  is smaller (larger) than .
Proof. From (34), we know that @g=@s = 0 at hn(s) = . From (37), we know that
@ ln c0=@s = 0 at hn(s) = . Suppose  = . Then, (38) shows that su = sg. If   (),
then su  ()sg because hn(s) is increasing in s.
Finally, we discuss how the supply of unskilled labor L a¤ects the welfare-maximizing
prot-division rule. From (25) and (26), we see that neither the arbitrage condition nor the
29It is useful to note that as in the case of the growth-maximizing prot-division rule, the welfare-
maximizing prot-division rule can be a corner solution (i.e., su ! 0 or su ! 1).
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resource constraint depend on L. Therefore, the supply of unskilled labor has no e¤ect on the
growth-maximizing prot-division rule. Furthermore, given that is increasing in L, it must
be the case that su is increasing in L. Intuitively, a larger supply of unskilled labor increases
output per variety and magnies the positive e¤ect of n on the initial level of consumption
ln c0 = n
 lnL  n lnn through the term n lnL. Given that the welfare-maximizing su is
increasing in L while the growth-maximizing sg is independent of L, we have the following
result illustrated in Figure 2.
Lets rstly dene a threshold value of L given by L  'nne=.
Corollary 2 If L is smaller (larger) than L, then su is below (above) sg.
Proof. This result follows from Proposition 3 because L  L  'nne= is equivalent to
  .
25
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to illustrate quantitatively the growth and welfare
e¤ects of strengthening blocking patents (i.e., increasing s). First, we evaluate the e¤ects of
increasing s from 0 to 1 on steady-state welfare. Then, we simulate the transition dynamics to
compute the complete welfare changes. Specically, we consider two types of policy reform:
(a) an immediate increase in s, and (b) a gradual increase in s.
5.1 Steady-state welfare
For the structural parameters, we either consider conventional parameter values or calibrate
their values by using empirical moments in the US before the patent-policy reform in 1982.
For the discount rate , we set it to 0.03.30 For the R&D externality parameters q and n,
we consider the symmetric case of  = q = n and follow Jones and Williams (2000) to
consider a value of  = 0:5.31 Similarly, we consider the symmetric case of ' = 'q = 'n for
R&D productivity as in Gersbach et al. (2009).32 To calibrate the values of the remaining
structural parameters ', , z and L, we use the following four empirical moments (i) the
arrival rate of vertical innovation, (ii) the average growth rate of total factor productivity,
(iii) R&D as a share of GDP, and (iv) the ratio of R&D scientists and engineers to labor
force. For (i), we follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009) to consider an innovation-arrival
rate of  = 0:33. For (ii), we consider a value of g = 1:5%. For (iii), we use a value of
30We have also considered a higher discount rate of 0.05. Although the welfare gains become smaller, the
qualitative implication of our results remains unchanged.
31While Kortums (1992) estimated value for a parameter similar to  is 0.2, Jones and Williams (2000)
use the empirical estimates of the social return to R&D to show that a lower bound for  is 0:5. Therefore,
we use  = 0:5 as our benchmark.
32In this calibration exercise, we consider the benchmark case of symmetric R&D parameters because
a more detailed calibration requires disaggregate data on vertical and horizontal R&D. Unfortunately, we
do not know of such data. However, if we follow the interpretation of Aghion and Howitt (1996) to treat
horizontal R&D mainly as basic research and vertical R&D as applied research, then we can consider the data
on basic R&D as a benchmark. According to OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators, basic R&D
is about 0.33% of US GDP in 1982. In our models calibration, about 26% of high-skill labor is allocated to
horizontal R&D implying that horizontal R&D as a share of GDP is about 0.39%. Therefore, the calibration
based on symmetric R&D parameters is roughly in line with the data.
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R&D=GDP = wh=(wh +wlL+ n
) = 1:5%. For (iv), there were 711.8 thousands full-time
equivalent R&D scientists and engineers in the US in 1982,33 and there were 110.2 millions
people in the US labor force in 1982. Given these empirical moments, we have the following
calibrated values f'; ; z; Lg = f0:64; 0:12; 1:02; 153:8g.
Table 1: E¤ects of s on growth and welfare
s 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8 1:0
 0:33 0:30 0:27 0:25 0:22 0:18
g 1:500% 1:513% 1:505% 1:474% 1:413% 1:301%
U 388:1 417:4 445:5 473:0 500:8 530:1
Table 1 shows that an increase in s would stie vertical innovation by decreasing the
arrival rate of productivity improvements. Despite the increase in horizontal innovation,
the overall growth rate eventually decreases. This nding is consistent with the recent
concerns about patent protection stiing the innovation process. However, Table 1 also
suggests an interesting possibility that despite the lower growth rate, steady-state welfare U
in (35) increases due to the higher rate of horizontal innovation.3435 This illustrative exercise
suggests the importance of taking into consideration the stimulating e¤ect of s on horizontal
innovation for a proper welfare analysis.
33This data is obtained from National Science Foundation. See the number of full-time equivalent R&D
scientists and engineers in the US.
34It is useful to note that this nding of a welfare gain is robust to the normalization of q0(i) = 0 for all i.
In the case of q0(i) = q > 0 for all i, the welfare gain would have been more substantial because q > 0 has
the same e¤ect as a larger L as discussed before.
35We have also considered a hypothetical value of s = 1:1 and nd that welfare continues to increase in s.
This result also applies to the subsequent results with transition dynamics. However, a potential problem
with s > 1 is that if patent infringment occurs only when an entrant launches her product in the market
(rather than when she comes up with the innovation), she may not have the incentives to launch her high-
quality product to avoid paying the penality to the incumbent. If every subsequent entrant acts in this way,
then vertical innovation would come to a halt.
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5.2 Immediate patent reform
In the previous section, we evaluated the e¤ects of an increase in s on steady-state welfare.
However, such an analysis neglects the welfare changes during the transition path. Therefore,
in this section, we simulate the transition dynamics of the model.36 Given the transition
path of the consumption index, we can then evaluate the complete welfare e¤ects of an
immediate increase in s from s = 0 to s 2 f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g. Comparing Tables 1 and
2, we see that increasing s would improve welfare even taking into consideration transition
dynamics. However, the magnitude of the welfare improvement is smaller than in the case
of steady-state welfare.
Table 2: Welfare e¤ects of an immediate increase in s
s 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8 1:0
U(transition) 388:1 411:8 434:4 456:3 478:0 500:4
5.3 Gradual patent reform
In the previous section, we evaluated the welfare e¤ects of an immediate increase in s.
However, in the US, the patent reform may be more accurately described as a gradual
reform. For example, in 1982, the US Congress established the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) as a centralized appellate court for patent cases. "Over the next
decade, in case after case, the court signicantly broadened and strengthened the rights
of patent holders."37 Also, the Ginarte-Park index (described in Section 1) shows that the
strength of patent protection in the US gradually increases from 3.8 in 1975 to 4.9 in 1995.38
36See Appendix B for a description of the dynamic system and the numerical algorithm.
37Ja¤e and Lerner (2004, p. 9-10).
38The Ginarte-Park index is an aggregate measure of patent rights rather than a direct measure of the
prot-division rule. Although an empirical measure of "s" is not available, the anecdotal evidence from Ja¤e
and Lerner (2004) seems to suggest that it increases gradually in the US rather than once and for all in the
early 1980s.
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Table 3: Index of patent rights from Park (2008)
Year 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States 3:83 4:35 4:68 4:68 4:88 4:88 4:88
Therefore, in this section, we evaluate the welfare e¤ects of a gradual increase in s from
s = 0 to s 2 f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g. Following Cozzi and Galli (2009), we consider a law of
motion for st given by
:
st =  (s  st), (40)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the speed of the patent reform. In the numerical
exercise, we consider  = 0:05 for illustrative purposes. Table 4 shows that a gradual increase
in s would improve social welfare but by a smaller magnitude than an immediate increase in
s. Furthermore, the welfare gain is increasing in  (i.e., increasing in the speed of reform).
As  approaches one, the welfare gain becomes the same as in Section 5.2.
Table 4: Welfare e¤ects of a gradual increase in s
s 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8 1:0
U( = 0:05) 388:1 404:7 420:8 436:3 451:6 467:1
6 Conclusion
This study develops a simple growth model to shed some light on an often debated question
that is whether patent protection stimulates or sties innovation. We show that both sides
of the argument are valid. Specically, protecting incumbents at the expense of entrants
would stimulate horizontal innovation but stie vertical innovation, and the opposite occurs
when entrants are protected against incumbents. Although the distinction between vertical
and horizontal innovation is blurred in reality, our point is still valid in the sense that patent
protection has asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent types of innovation that have di¤erent chances
of patent infringements, and hence, the traditional tradeo¤of optimal patent protection needs
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to be modied to take into account this asymmetric e¤ect of patent policy. In other words,
the optimal patent policy should be innovation-specic. If vertical (horizontal) innovation is
crucial to social welfare, then a more frontloading (backloading) prot-division rule should
be implemented. Furthermore, if we follow Aghion and Howitt (1996) to treat horizontal
R&D as basic research and vertical R&D as applied research, then our nding implies that a
gradual increase in the bargaining power of the basic researchers could be welfare-improving,
and this nding is consistent with the two-stage R&D analysis in Cozzi and Galli (2009),
who consider a transition to more upstream bargaining power.
Finally, in this study, we have considered a stylized growth model for analytical tractabil-
ity, and the numerical exercises are for illustrative purposes. Therefore, it would be inter-
esting for future studies to develop a more general dynamic general-equilibrium model to
obtain more precise quantitative implications of strengthening patent protection.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From (23), the value of a quality improvement is v1 = ++

1  s+ s 
++

for a rm that does not own the previous innovation. For an incumbent (i.e., a rm
that owns the previous innovation), the incremental value of a quality improvement is
vI =

++

1 + s 
++

  v2.39 The rst term in vI reects that the rms new prod-
uct infringes its own patent and hence it does not have to pay any licensing fee. The second
term (i.e.,  v2) reects that the incumbents old invention loses the opportunity to extract
prot from the new entrant. Substituting v2 = ++s into vI yields vI = v1 for s 2 [0; 1],
so that the incumbent is indi¤erent as to where to target innovation. As a result, all the
aggregate variables behave as if quality improvement is targeted only by the entrants (i.e.,
the Arrow replacement e¤ect).40
Proof of Lemma 2. Lets rstly dene a new variable x  'q(hq)q and a new function
f(x)  1
+  + (1 + s)x

x
(1  s)(+ ) + x

. (A1)
Simple di¤erentiation yields
argmax f(x) = (+ )
r
1  s
1 + s
. (A2)
Given that dhn=dhq in (28) is decreasing in f(x), maximizing f(x) is equivalent to minimizing
39To be consistent with the assumption of no market-power consolidation, an upper bound of z is imposed
on the markup, so that  is the same in v1 and vI . In the case of market-power consolidation, the markup
would be given by z2 regardless of whether or not the two generations of quality improvement are owned by
the same rm, so that  would be the same in v1 and vI as well.
40This new interpretation of the Arrow e¤ect is developed by Cozzi (2007), who shows that the incumbents
current invention faces the same probability of being displaced regardless of whether or not an incumbent
targets innovation at her own industry. Under the traditional interpretation (i.e., when an incumbent
obtains a new invention, she loses the value of the old invention), it should be v1 (instead of v2) that is
substracted from vI . In this case, vI = ++

1 + s ++

  v1 = ++s, and hence vI < v1 () s <bs  ++2(+)+ 2 [0:5; 1]. Therefore, when s < bs, quality improvement is targeted by entrants only, so that the
Arrow replacement e¤ect is again present.
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the bracketed term in (28). Substituting (A2) into (28) yields
dhn
dhq
=
1
1  n

1  q   q
s2
2  s2 + 2p1  s2

hn
hq
. (A3)
Manipulating (A3) shows that q < [1  0:5s2=(1 +
p
1  s2)] 2 [0:5; 1] implies dhn=dhq > 0
in (28) for any value of hq > 0.
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Appendix B: Transition dynamics
The system of equations that characterizes the dynamics of the model is as follows.
:
n

t = 'n(hn;t)
n   nt (B1)
:
t=t =   rt (B2)
:
v2;t = (rt + t + )v2;t   st (B3)
:
v1;t = (rt + t + )v1;t   tv2;t   (1  s)t (B4)
:
vn;t = (rt + t + )vn;t   tv2;t   t (B5)
t =

z   1
z

1
t
(B6)
t = 'q(hq;t)
q (B7)
v1;t'q(hq;t)
q 1 = vn;t'n(hn;t)
n 1 (B8)
hn;t + n

thq;t = 1 (B9)
nt lt = L (B10)
t = (z   1)wl;tlt =

z   1
z

1
t
=) zwl;tlt = 1
t
(B11)
Finally, we choose lt as the numeraire by setting wl;t = 1. The endogenous variables in this
system are fnt ; t; v2;t; v1;t; vn;t; t; t; hq;t; hn;t; lt; rtg.
In all our numerical simulations, in order to simulate the dynamic transition from one
steady state to another, we rst compute the initial steady state and the nal steady state,
associated with the initial and nal level of s; then we discretize all the di¤erential equations
in system (B1)-(B11), and plug them as well as the remaining equation restrictions in a
.mod le, which allows Dynare to apply its deterministic routines, needed to compute the
dynamic rational expectations equilibrium transition from the initial to the nal steady state.
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Since Dynare also analyses the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the nal steady state,
while simulating the transitional path we always make sure that in all our simulations the
conditions for the determinacy of the steady state are satised, that is the number of stable
eigenvalues is equal to the number of predetermined variables. Hence, all the transitional
paths we have obtained are along the unique equilibrium of the economy analyzed.
In order to calculate the complete change in welfare, we need to keep track of the evolution
of the consumption index.
ln ct =
ntZ
0
(qt(i) ln z + ln lt(i))di =
0@ ntZ
0
qt(i)di
1A ln z + nt ln lt. (B12)
Normalizing q0(i) = 0 for all i, we can re-express the level of aggregate technology as
ntZ
0
qt(i)di =
tZ
0
nd +
tZ
0
:
n


0@ Z
0
d
1A d . (B13)
The rst term on the right hand side of (B13) is the accumulated number of productivity
improvements that have occurred from time 0 to time t. The second term on the right
hand side of (B13) is the change in aggregate technology due to the introduction of new
varieties net of obsolescence. Using the data generated by Dynare, we could then compute
the discretized version of the welfare integral, which allowed the welfare experiments reported
in the tables of Section 5.
Notice that by normalizing q0(i) = 0 for all i, in light of (B13), we are minimizing the
e¤ect of
:
n

t on welfare. This proves the robustness of the welfare comparisons in Tables
2 and 4. Given that nt increases from the initial steady state to the new steady state in
our numerical exercises, any alternative positive level of the q0(i)s would imply a higher
transitional welfare e¤ect of an increase in s.
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